|
A NEW CONSTITUTION To End the Excessive Power of Prime Ministers |
A
CIVIC REPUBLICAN MANIFESTO 2009 For Great Britain VIRTUE FREEDOM ASPIRATION WEALTH PEACE |
DEBT FREE MONEY
To End the Misery of Debt Based Money |
 19TH CENTURY BRITISH REPUBLICAN TRICOLOR Since adopted as National Flag of Republic of Hungary |
REINVENTING BRITISH CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM |
 JAMES HARRINGTON Political Philosopher (1611-1677) BRITISH REPUBLICAN |
| For up to date comments on current news stories from a Civic Republican point of view go to | ||
|
"There is a fellowship of the entire human race, united by reason, speech and natural law. But there is a particularly strong bond between citizens" Cicero (circa 50 BCE) |
||
| HOME DEBT FREE MONEY INSTITUTIONS IDEALS CONSTITUTION CONTACT | ||
|
The sections can be read in any order but it is best to start with the three INTRODUCTION sections.(Grayed out pages have not yet been posted) --------------------
Economic Enfranchisement Non-aggressive Foreign Relations
Authority to Create Constitution Lower House Upper House Judiciary Supreme Court Public Services Monetary Policy Regions and Federation (to be completed)
Meritocracy Civil Society Crime and Penal reform Vice Cultural and Intellectual Life Church Disestablished Virtue and Happiness Young Generation
Monetary Policy (to be completed) Existing MPC and FSA Banking Money Flow Currency Industry
First British Republic History of Republicanism
Problems of Current System Advantage Votes Electoral System
National Flag Federal Flag
Republican Theory General History of Republicanism in Britain First Republic Period in Britain British Constitution Economics Enlightenment
The Need for a Republican Party
|
REPUBLICANISM
2500 years ago the genius of the ancient Classical world made a profound innovation in the nature of a state. The state was conceived of as an impersonal entity separate from the Leader. This separation had not previously existed in so explicit a way. For instance, in ancient Egypt the Pharaoh was the state (not to mention its God as well).
But if the state was no longer identified with a person, what exactly was it to be? The answer is a Constitution - a Constitution that is above all its citizens, and this includes the Leader or Executive and all members of the government and armed forces. Leaders may come and go, but the Constitution remains.
When we talk of a Republic, literally the "Thing that is the People", (as opposed to the "Thing that is the Ruler") we talk about a Constitution. This is the way we define a Republic. This is why the Constitution is essential to any discussion of Republics or Republicanism. This is why in Republics the Constitution is revered above any principle or any leader.
Monarchical states too, of course, can have constitutions, but, under Constitutional Monarchies, the Monarch is usually not subject to all the laws of the nation as everyone else is. This is the case with the United Kingdom where the Monarch is correctly described as in some ways being above the law. Whilst this is an irritation for it is flagrantly unjust, it is, in itself, not of direct, major consequence for the Monarch's subjects in their day to day lives.
What is of major consequence with regard to the constitution, however, is one of the powers invested in the office of Prime Minister that exists in no other Modern democratic state anywhere: the Prime Minister can change the constitution at will.
This effectively compounds the office of Executive with the Constitution, denying the British people of today the great gains that were available to citizens of the newly created Roman Republic two and half thousand years ago.
Britain defies the nature of Modern constitutions by virtue of its antiquated Monarchical constitution, but a greater insult to Modern constitutionalism is the fact the Executive's Power extends to cover constitutional change.
But what makes Executive Power over the constitution a farce is that an incoming change of government has exactly the same power over the constitution as the one it replaces and so previous changes can simply be reversed.
This laxity of the Kingdom's constitution is a primary (but by no means the only) way in which the people are denied a say in their government. It can only be corrected by modifying its constitution into a Republican Constitution where stability can be put in place.
The Republican Constitution will be devised so as to incorporate and balance the Five Ideals of a Modern State which are as follows:
I. Republicanism II. Liberalism III. Democracy IV. Economic Enfranchisement V. Non-Aggressive Foreign Relations
As Ideals it is recognised that these can only be realised imperfectly and that, furthermore they may conflict one with another. Therefore, it will be a matter for mature judgment as to how the balance between them can best be struck. In this task we are fortunate in having in the Kingdom already in place many features that can be regarded as Republican. We are also fortunate in the 21st century in having the experience of a great number of Republican nations, both existing and historical, to learn from.
The first Ideal of Republicanism will be here considered.
* * *
The Ideal of Republicanism is defined by the following Five Practical Aspects:
These Aspects will be considered in order. * * * 1. A Civil Society comprising Civil Institutions (Government or Chartered) whose members are appointed (according to merit, qualification or achievement) The Kingdom is ruled by a democratically elected Executive and a problem of all democratic countries is that the leaders only have security of office for the duration of the electoral cycle which is short term, in this case, five years. The nation state, however, has long term interests, we could say, permanent long term interests.
As a result, decision making by the Executive is not in many cases appropriate, for when they are subject to the pressing demands of the next election only exceptional individuals are capable of sacrificing their own interests for a long term view. Furthermore, the electorate is locked into the same five year cycle and there is little compulsion for the Executive to educate them to think differently.
An Absolute Monarchy can be thought of as not having this problem of short termism, at least, not in such acute form. The Monarch will rule until the end of his or her life and then will be succeeded by their descendents, effectively, in the best cases, extending their interest in decision making way into the future. However, an Absolute Monarchy has other undesirable features for a Modern state, notably that the hereditary principle does not now bestow authority as it once did.
As Democratic Institutions are inherently short term, we have to devise Institutions whose members are capable of taking decisions for the long term, not just for the duration of the lives of the members of that Institution but beyond. For this we need Civil Institutions.
Nations owe their present day Civil Institutions to a great extent to constitutional innovations made by the Romans before the Common Era. Civil Institutions are one of the Aspects of Republicanism. They are the bedrock upon which the Republic must be built and we need to understand how they are quite different from Democratic Institutions.
An example of a Democratic Institution is the House of Commons as it presently constituted. Membership is by virtue of democratic elections (however imperfect).
Although the way it has to operate is rather more complicated than the following, a Civil Institution can be simply defined as an Institution "whose members are appointed, according to merit, qualification or achievement". We have many Civil Institutions in the United Kingdom and an example would be the House of Lords, if it is envisaged as only being made up of Life Peers, as, indeed, was the policy intention until recently.
Membership of the House of Lords, thus conceived, is, at least in theory, awarded because the person concerned has some achievement behind them or has a special qualification or some demonstrable merit. Of course, recently this principle of appointment has been corrupted by the strong suspicion that the membership of the House of Lords, where it was in the gift of the New Labour Executive, was awarded by virtue of Party donations, the so-called "cash for honours" affair. But this shows a weakness in the present appointment procedures not any principle.
It may seem odd that a seemingly archaic Institution like the House of Lords should be described a type of Institution that characterises Republicanism, but it does this if it does not have the hereditary element (which is, in any case, being phased out), leaving appointment being subject to merit, qualification and/or achievement.
But with membership being subject to appointment in this way, does not that make the House of Lords undemocratic? It most certainly does! Is not that a bad thing? Not necessarily. The faults that arise in attempting to realise the Democratic Ideal have to be balanced in the Constitution, and the Republican Aspects will have to play a roll in this. A major problem of Democracy as described above is short termism due to the electoral cycle. Appointment for life as the House of Lords has is a good counter to this. Without the threat of losing their seat they can afford to be more objective and long term in formulating their views.
The problem with the principle of life peerages that is often raised is that the Lords are not accountable. In voting a certain way they are not beholden for instance to a democratic electorate. So how can they vote responsibly. This is the view of the cynic, but that alone does not mean it is wrong.
Life peers are there, or should be there, because of a life of achievement and experience and because of proven merit and quality. Within the sleazy world of New Labour and old Tories this idea may sound like a joke, but with proper appointment procedures in place the appointments could work well. The problem is that the existing appointment procedures are badly conceived and lead to abuses.
At present, Constitutional reform of the Upper House, the House of Lords, is the subject of a White Paper and the decision has been made in favour of membership being decided by democratic election. This may turn out to be a grave error if the recommendation is ever followed through.
With the poor quality of constitutional debate in the Kingdom, and the almost total ignorance of Republican Constitutionalism, it is not surprising that there is a knee jerk reaction to make the Upper House "democratic". But with this decision we may be throwing away a valuable feature of the existing constitutional arrangements with little idea of what we are losing and even less idea of where we are heading.
Part of the problem lies also in a failure to understand the vital role the Upper House should have and this results again from the inevitable focus on Democracy with the almost total ignorance of how Modern Constitutions work.
Well, it is ignorance from the point of view of those not in charge. The New Labour Executive is no doubt more canny and sees that a democratically elected Upper House would work decisively in the Executive's interest for a simple reason. The constituency that elects the Upper House will be the same one (i.e. the general electorate) that elects the Lower and so is likely to deliver a similar result in elections. So the strong likelihood is that representation in the Commons will closely parallel that in the Lords giving the Executive control over both Houses!
This is a classic example of more of the democratic principle and less of the republican principle working to create more Executive power, and Executive power is already, by any standard, excessive in the Kingdom. The smile on the faces of New Labour leaders announcing more Democracy to a grateful, acquiescent people can only be there because practically nobody in the Kingdom has any understanding of what Democracy really means and Republicanism is just a far off concept of which we know little. The opposition parties, of course, haven't a clue either.
By having the Upper House appointed, the constituency which forms it has little in common with the Lower House, and so a true Separation of Power is achieved. 1 This refers us to the Second Aspect of Republicanism of which more in a moment, but let us look a little more at Civil Institutions.
The above discussion contrasting the two Houses of Parliament serves as in introduction to the concept of Civil Institutions. In our non-Republican nation we already have many of these and they have served us well down the years. They are intensely disliked by Populist leaders like Prime Ministers Thatcher and Blair as they recognise that they serve to curb Executive Power. Attacks on Civil Institutions by the Executive are frequent.
It has always been such. The outstanding example of a Government Civil Institution must be the Judiciary. The Judiciary is a non-democratic institution for none of its positions are elected. Barristers are there because of qualification, judges because of qualification and merit and experience, magistrates because of merit.2 The principle of independence of the Judiciary has for centuries been one of the points of pride of the British system even if, prior to the Civil War between the Monarch Charles Stuart and Parliament, the Monarch had a degree of control over it.
The Civil Institution of the Judiciary, separate from Parliament and the Monarch or any other Executive, has always been fundamental to freedom and protection from Excessive Executive Power in Britain. In latter years it became the rock upon which Democracy could be built and it is sure there would have been, and would be no, Democracy without it. And Democracy in turn has come to provide protection for the Judiciary for any assault on it can be revealed by the openness that Democracy demands and challenged through the ballot box.
Similarly the independence of the Judiciary allowed the creation of the Magna Carta and the principle of Habeas Corpus. Although the words were not used at that time, the Magna Carta amounted to what we would call a "Bill of Rights" and so it introduced an element of "Liberalism" onto British shores, that, in spite of the predictable attacks by the Executive, has remained solid. Once Ideals like Liberalism and Independent Civil Institutions take root in a nation they are virtually impossible to shift *.
* * *
2. Different Powers or Functions of Government are defined (such as Executive, Legislature or Judiciary), and these are embodied in separate, independent Government Institutions (which may be Civil or Democratic Institutions.
The principle of Separation of the Powers of Government we tend to associate with the great French Enlightenment political philosopher, Montesquieu. Significantly, for British Republicans Montesquieu drew his ideas, as he fully acknowledged, from his observations of how the British system worked at that time.
No greater reminder could exist that Republicanism is a fact of British Constitutional arrangements even if many refuse to recognise it. It reminds us that the move to a Republican system will mean less change for us than such a change has meant for other countries. We are way over half way there already.
Having said that, as will become clear in a moment, the current arrangements in the Kingdom, from Montesquieu's point of view, are far, far less Republican than in his time.
Montesquieu identified three essential Powers of State:
Firstly, the Executive which is responsible for day to day policy, what we might call crisis management, foreign relations (including waging war), controlling public services (a much bigger element now than in Montesquieu's day) and collection of taxes.
Secondly, the Legislature which is responsible for making, but not enforcing, laws of the land.
Thirdly, the Judiciary which is responsible for subjecting people to fair trial for alleged infringements of the laws.
When Montesquieu looked at how the British system operated (and he had spent some time in England) what he saw was essentially this separation of powers into three institutions of state. The Monarch embodied the Executive Function, Parliament the Legislative Function and lastly there was Judiciary.
Of course, such institutions had long existed before Montesquieu. His originality was to describe the concepts of the "Powers" of Executive, Legislature and Judiciary which could attach themselves to different institutions as they might be realised in different nations.
In theory, in England, the Judiciary had had a measure of independence from the Monarch and Parliament since at least the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215. In practice autocratic Monarchs such as Charles I had preferred to meddle with the Judiciary even to the extent of creating their own arbitrary courts of justice. (The villainous Star Chamber is an example of this.) Similarly, unscrupulous Monarchs had difficulty in accepting the independence of the Legislature (Parliament) and constantly interfered with it. This culminated in the Civil Wars. Following these the First Republic was founded.
However, the settlement following the Restoration of the Monarch after the First Republic made the Separation of the Institutions of Monarch, Legislature and Judiciary more robust and it was this that Montesquieu had observed.
It is possible to describe Montesquieu as a Republican, but not a Democratic Republican for he favored keeping the Monarch as the Executive. The alternative to a Monarch of having an elected Executive (a President) had no appeal for him as he saw the dangers of having Populist leaders who would pander to short term electoral demands ignoring the long term interests of the nation and who could undermine the integrity of the nation by appealing to restricted interest groups. The Monarch, he argued, would be above all this.
It must be stressed that it was a Constitutional Monarch he wished for, not an Absolute Monarch on French lines whom he would have called in the terms of his times a "tyrant".
Montesquieu entered the panoply of revered Republican writers when his ideas became very influential on the Framers of the American Constitution. The principle of Separation of Powers became one of its cornerstones. The Executive was embodied in the office of President who then chose his Cabinet to enable him to carry out the executive function. The Legislature became Congress which was separate from the Executive and the Judiciary.
Democracy was incorporated into the selection of the President and Congress, making the Constitution truly one of a Modern state.
* * *
As the Constitution developed it became clear that with a Republican Constitution a fourth Power or Function was needed. It was all very well to write a Constitution defining the different Institutions and how they should be formed and relate to each other, but the Framers wisely appreciated that provision must be made for resolving disputes between these different Institutions regarding the nature and extent of the remit of each, amongst other things.
Without this provision the Constitution itself could be called into question and conflict, even war, could result. The Framers only had to look to history for confirmation of this possibility. The English Civil Wars resulted from the Monarch and Parliament not being able to agree on who had what authority. The Roman Republic fell apart, some argued, because the Assemblies (the Plebs) took over too much power from the Senate (the Aristocracy). In neither case was there a higher authority to adjudicate on the issue.
The bold move that the Framers made was to create a superior body that had the power to resolve such matters: the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court would perform a Function that did not exist in the Britain which Montesquieu relied upon so heavily for his model and so had not identified the need for one. This Function is is called here Protector of the Constitution. 4
Under the Constitution the Supreme Court is regarded not as a separate Function, but as part of the Judiciary. Whether you describe it as a separate Function or one incorporated into the Judiciary is a mute point for it operates according to its own independent remit. In France and Germany the separation is explicit as they have "Constitutional Courts" which perform the Function of Protector of the Constitution.
The creation of the Supreme Court posed the question of how it should be made up given the fact that it would have to judge on the Constitution and so make decisions of the most profound nature for the future of the nation. There was never any question of it being a Democratic Institution - only a Civil Institution would be capable of embodying the highest issues of state and jurisprudence.
We need not go into the details of the appointment system chosen here. Occasionally appointments make the news because they are controversial and usually for one reason. They are seen to be political and the political fray is precisely what the Supreme Court as Protector of the Constitution is supposed to be above.
What is worth drawing attention to is that appointment to the Supreme Court is for life. This is in order that the members of the court will not be persuaded to make decisions that might profit them in a future situation and in order that they can never distance themselves from the Supreme Court rulings in their life time.5
* * *
It was mentioned that Montesquieu would find the English constitutional arrangements as they exist at present less acceptable than those he observed in the eighteenth century. The reason for this is that since those times the role of the Monarchy has undergone a profound change and with it the role of Parliament.
In fact, nothing has changed in the constitution of the Kingdom in so far as there is one. What has changed is that no one now will accept that a person should run the country as a result of birth or marriage. Unlike in former times, this will simply not bestow the necessary authority. It is one thing to have theoretical constitutional power (and the British Monarch has that in full) but without an authority acceptable to the people such power means nothing.
But what would have disturbed Montesquieu most about the current situation is that, by the Monarch losing authority, all the power of the Executive has flowed to the Cabinet Office which is made up of MPs. This means that the Executive and the Legislature are rolled into one office - the Leader of Cabinet, the Prime Minister.
The Separation of Powers that Montesquieu described so forcefully as being necessary for a Modern state has been lost in the state that he so admired. But the situation is even worse than this, for the Executive also has the power to make (not initiate, make) constitutional changes and so the function of Protector of the Constitution falls to the Executive as well. And what a Protector!
New Labour has been obsessed with messing with the constitution since assuming power. The changes it proposes are inevitably designed to strengthen the democratic "mandate", that is to say, to allow the Executive, once installed, to do whatever it likes.
Before New Labour, Prime Minister Thatcher practised social engineering (destruction of the manufacturing base, social housing sales, poll tax) to consolidate Conservative support in the population, but New Labour has favoured constitutional reform to consolidate its support.
The mess of devolution with different formulas designed for Wales, Scotland, England and Northern Ireland each adapted to giving as little as possible away in each of the "countries", democratic election for members to the Upper House to emasculate its independence from established parties and, now, the absurd recent proposal that the Lower House should vote on when to hold a general election, are all concoctions to try to favour the fortunes of New Labour in the democratic process. New Labour as Protector of the Constitution is like sending a thief to look after your property.9
With three of the four functions of government wrapped up into one office of Prime Minister it is fortunate that the Judiciary has remained independent and it is to this fact that we owe the freedom that we enjoy. Nevertheless, such is the power of the Executive in the Kingdom that frequent attacks on the independence even of the Judiciary are made. 7
In the Kingdom, Republicanism is often thought to be just a matter of abolishing the Monarchy and replacing it by a "President" who would assume only ceremonial roles as we might say the present Queen does. 8 This would be the gravest folly as it would leave us with the compounding of the Function of Executive with the Functions of Legislature and Protector of the Constitution that the wisdom of the 18th century Enlightenment identified as so dangerous to the political life of a nation.
* * *
3. Checks and Balances operating between the Institutions embodying these Functions of State
It was also part of Montesquieu's thesis that having designed the Government Institutions as independent entities, there should then exist between them a system of checks and balances. The purpose of this is to prevent an accumulation of power in any office, not just the Executive, for wherever power exists it tends to want to extend itself.
Montesquieu could again look to the contemporary British example where the House of Lords could amend legislation that was being passed by the House of Commons. (This feature has survived and we continue to benefit from it.)
This is constitutionally sound for it is right that the elected House should make the legislation, so that the people exercise democratic control over the laws to which they are subject. If the Lords is imagined as being made up of life peers rather than hereditary lords, then the Upper House is bringing to bear its experience and considered judgment on the initiatives of the Lower.
Thus a check on the tendency to pander to Populist desires that the democratic Lower House inevitably suffers from is balanced by the longer term alternative view of those who are not tempted to adjust their honestly held views to satisfy any electoral requirements. If this works well, as, even in the Kingdom with its skewed constitution, it sometimes does, then we have Republicanism at work, albeit by another name.
An example from the United States that we often witness is where the President (Executive) wishes to enact a policy but has to gain the approval of the House of Representative (Legislature) as the latter holds the purse strings. This is fine for the President if it is his or her party that controls the House of Representatives, but because the House is reelected every two years and the President every four it can quite easily happen that it is a different party that controls the House. A check is thus put on the President's power.
By contrast this is not a situation that any British Prime Minister with a reasonable majority would recognise. In fact, when we talk about checks and balances in relation to the British Executive there are remarkably a few. The British Executive can do virtually what it likes.
In theory, the Prime Minister is accountable to Parliament and the spectacle of Prime Minister's Question Time is a manifestation of this. Of course, every one knows that because the Prime Minister's party inevitably has a majority in the Commons, he or she is hardly answerable to anyone and the impotence of MPs explains why Prime Minister's Question Time often descends into an embarrassing adolescent shambles.
* * *
4. Regional/Local Government Civil and Democratic Institutions to balance with the center
It was described above how in drafting the American Constitution the Framers found it necessary to add a fourth Function of Government to Montesquieu's three. To the Functions of Executive, Legislature and Judiciary was added, what is here called, Protector of the Constitution
There was, however, a further innovation that was made in the New World and this was in the creating of a Federation with substantial powers for the elements that made up the Federation, i.e. the States.
The necessity for a federation arose from the fact that the new "nation", if that what it was to be, had until that time not been governed as a unity by the colonial power of Great Britain but as separate States. Vital questions therefore presented themselves concerning how the existing states should be amalgamated together, the degree of central or "Federal" power and authority and the degree of State power and authority.
There was no precedent available to learn from and so a protracted debate ensued in order to decide if and how the matter was to be resolved in the Constitution. This debate which is fully recorded is one of the foundation stones of Modern Republican thinking and is of a quality that, in the current unsophisticated intellectual climate, we can only marvel at. 10
We need not at this point go into the details of the Federal arrangements involved, except to note that it was decided to found a Federation of States rather than a Confederation (the latter being a less centralised arrangement).
What is more important is that a new Republic was founded where the principle of power being delegated away from the centre was fundamental. And the powers invested in the States were not insignificant. Crucially they included tax raising powers that allow a State a degree of fiscal autonomy and this means very real autonomy.
Following the American example, the federal or regional model has been adopted by most Modern Republics, and so the twin innovations of the American Republic of the Protector of the Constitution and Regional Autonomy have passed into the general practice of Republics although the forms that these take vary in each case.
The degree of Regional Autonomy in the United Kingdom currently varies across its lands, and this reflects the requirements of expediency judged necessary by successive administrations to preserve the maximum of control in the center. The hotchpotch of devolutional arrangements for the different parts of the Kingdom would be an embarrassment for any nation that was truly conscious of the needs of Modern (i.e. post Mediaeval) Constitutionalism.
Montesquieu's principle of the Separation of Powers and having Checks and Balances between them is now extended to the Autonomous Regions, in whatever form they take, and is now an essential Aspect of Republicanism. The United Republic of Great Britain must accordingly be a Federation with real powers dispersed to the Regions.
* * * 5. Public Services (including the Military) provided for the benefit of the nation's people, organisation, businesses and natural resources, and also to some extent, great or small, to contribute to the benefit of those things anywhere in the world
Ever since there have been civilisations of any kind there have been Military Services. Once a people has established something of value, it has to be defended. This a minimum role for the Military, although usually is it has aimed at more. There have always also been other Public Services, such as road building, but these have assumed a less important role.
With the creation of Modern States, especially since Montesquieu's time, a great number of different kinds of services have arisen alongside the military and these have mushroomed in size - Public Services.
For our purposes the military can be regarded as a Public Service for essentially it performs in the same way as any other Public Service. This regarding of the military as a Public Service is helpful in reminding us of the true nature of Public Services.
There has been a tendency over the last quarter of a century to forget this and to see Public Services as Private Enterprises, or to at least run them as if they were, if they have not actually been flogged off. "Privatisation" or "quasi-Privatisation" of the services is nothing new, for many attempts have been made by rulers in past, before the growth of other Public Services, to run the Military Service in this way. The word used to describe this kind of Military Service is "Mercenary".
Mercenaries have understandably never enjoyed a good reputation. They suffer from the obvious problem of loyalty, for any person who puts up their services for sale in this way is almost certain to go to the highest bidder. Worse, the lack of commitment to the hirer's interests or causes translates into a risk taking that is determined by the likelihood of easy booty, and the pleasure of pillaging prosperous communities, rather than the prospect of long term service to the people and long term returns.
The Roman Republic understood that the long term interests of the nation could never be served by mercenaries and so the Legions were made up only of Citizens, In fact, Roman citizenship was fully bound up with service in the Military.
Currently, the use of mercenaries by the Kingdom's Military Services is not the norm (the Ghurkas being the exception) but mercenaries have been fully co-opted into the non-Military Public Services. The traditional doubts about mercenaries in the Military regarding "booty" and "pillaging" described above have proved applicable in the non-Military Public Services!
A further problem with mercenaries that was there from the start is that they can be bought by other states. This is happening increasingly with the privatised public services as they are being acquired by state owned services in foreign countries, notably China and France. The irony of seeing state ownership of the services not being abolished by privatisation but being merely turned into foreign state ownership seems to be lost on the free marketeers who championed the sell off policy.
* * * The fix applied to these doubts and problems has usually been the creation of a Quango to oversee the operations of the mercenary and to penalise lack of performance or profiteering from their position (usually a monopoly or virtual monopoly). The cost of the Quango is never accumulated into the cost of the service to provide a true comparison with a state owned service.
The question of how to run the extensive monopolistic Public Services in a Modern State is a fundamental one, and as the foregoing comments indicate we have not yet solved this question satisfactorily. The evolution of a viable, fair and effective system of Public Services still lies ahead of us, but the following basic principles must apply to a state owned public service, of which they are still many - but that does not say too many.
Firstly, a state-owned Public Service must ultimately be controlled by the Executive. It has no accountability in the sense of accountability to market forces as a private company does and so accountability to the democratically elected Executive really is the only option.
Secondly, this control by the Executive must be taken to be control by Regional as well as Central Executives. This dissipation of control avoids the Central Executive being able to meddle unnecessarily with the Public Service and in particular using them as "political footballs".
Thirdly, with the same end in view plus the end of achieving long termism, the Upper House must exercise some control on the Executive's dealings with the Public Services, particularly in regard to restructuring and definitely in regard to sell offs.
Fourthly, Professionalism must be developed in employees of the Public Services, probably with the help of an Academy and a Chartered Institution.
Although Public Services is the Fifth Aspect of Republicanism to be discussed, this ordering should not be taken to indicate any priority of importance. One of the keys to running a Modern State lies in the organisation of the Public Services and this must be fully a part of the Constitution and so share the same degree of stability as all the elements of the Constitution.
The woes of not managing the Public Services well is something that particularly afflicts the Kingdom, mainly because of the short termism induced by over reliance on the leadership of an overbearing democratically elected Executive intent on manipulating the Public Services to gain electoral advantage.
The Public Services of the Kingdom do not bear comparison with those of our major European partners on the mainland, who have the advantages brought by Republican long termism and stability.
* * *
English soil has long been fertile ground for the three R's of Radicalism, Reformism and Republicanism. The fact that, in the history of Republicanism, Britain has lagged so far behind other nations in becoming a Republic can only be described with one word: ironic. No land has played a greater part in the development of Republican ideals than England apart from the land we now know as Italy.
Of course, Britain did create the world's first Modern Republican Nation State (as opposed to Republican City State) in the seventeenth century, although it was short-lived. It is possible to explain the tardiness of the final move to Republicanism by the fact that she was so far ahead that Republicanism simply arrived too early and could not be sustained in the face of a Europe that had not intellectually brushed off Monarchist attachments.
Perhaps the most significant factor is that reforms had taken place that meant that the British Monarchy was deprived of much of the power that Monarchs had elsewhere and so the need for a Republic was less pressing. Parliament and the Judiciary had achieved a real degree of independence which, following the Civil Wars and the ensuing legal trial and execution of the King, the Monarch dare not threaten.
A less well recognised factor is the outward expansion of the Kingdom's influence with the gradual construction of an Empire in distant lands. An aggressive foreign policy always works to stifle reform at home and this is often one reason why it is favoured by an established ruling class.
And a significant factor must also have been the grinding poverty and virtual slave labour endured by the majority of the Monarch's subjects during early Modern times. This was accentuated by the Industrial Revolution.
* * *
Although it may seem to some a paradox, it is, as we have seen, the decline and virtual disappearance of real power of the Monarchy that has now produced the most pressing reason to finally end the existing system and establish a Republic. The absence of Monarchical power has created a vacuum which under the constitution only Prime Ministerial power can fill.
This has left the country open to domination by a power hungry Prime Minister, but for many years Prime Ministers tended to rule through their Cabinets and rely heavily on the long established Civil Service which provided a flywheel of competence and experience.
The tendency to headstrong rule by a Prime Minister began with the short rule of Prime Minister Heath in the 1970's and was then fully exploited and developed by Prime Minister Thatcher in the 1980's. The Civil Service was anathema to such a Populist figure and she did a lot to erode its influence and stability.
Since her long period of office, domination of the governmental apparatus by the Prime Minister has become the norm and the old guard way of doing things is now all but forgotten by the new breed of elected politicians. We will never return to it.
All the dangers of Excessive Executive Power that have concerned Republican thinkers down the ages are now fully and manifestly present in the United Kingdom. The problems we know as "spin", kitchen cabinets, corrupt appointments, resignations by disgraced ministers, bypassing of parliament, incompetent economic management, degrading of public services, opportunist Quangos, massaging public finances - all are dangers that Republicans have long understood need to be guarded against, even if they have known them by other names. And these dangers can only be guarded against by a robust Republican Constitution and the Institutions that go with it.
To the above list of evils resulting from Prime Ministerial Power must now be added that of lying to the country in order to take it to war - a war that, as many warned in advance, would have untold malign consequences. Few individuals would be able to shamelessly shrug off the loss or ruining of so many young British lives in such a disastrous adventure as the Iraq war in the way that ex-Prime Minister Blair has done.
The fact that he did not resign once his treachery was publicly proven only accentuates the degree of detachment the office of Prime Minister now instills in its holder. Not only did his refusal irredeemably demean the office, it meant we had for a period in power a Head of Government that would be unable to defend the nation should a real aggressive threat materialise.
The Head of Government of the nation has to have the authority to go to war should that need arise. Prime Minister Blair had lost that authority. This demonstrates that the need for a new Constitution is not just to be better governed and more prosperous. The need extends to national security.
* * *
In order to complete this description of Republicanism we need to look a little more at history.
Democracy is about equality. One vote for one person and every vote has equal value. Republicanism is not about equality. The Civil Institutions that, we have noted, do so much to characterise a Republic are not by their nature egalitarian. People are appointed to them by virtue of merit, qualification or achievement, by virtue of being outstanding in some way, great or small, not because they are equal.
It may seem unlikely in some ways but the British constitutional arrangements that were so admired by Montesquieu have often been regarded as similar to the constitutional arrangements of the Roman Republic. The reason is that the tripartite combination of Monarchy, House of Lords and House of Commons were seen as paralleling the Consulate, Senate and Assemblies of ancient Rome.
Now this similarity is not so much in the constitutional relationship between the three bodies of each case (we know surprisingly little about how the Roman Constitution worked in detail) but in the sectors of society that each represented.
The British House of Commons and the Roman Assemblies represented the common people (the Plebs in Rome). The House of Lords represented the aristocracy (there were no life peers in Montesquieu's day) as did the Roman Senate. The British Monarch was, of course, a Royal and the Roman Consuls (there were two at any time) were thought to descend from the Patrician class, who were related to the old Kings, prior to the establishment of the Republic. Thus the three tiers of society were reflected in the constitutions.
The Roman system was long thought to have great virtue because of a principle that in our Democratic age may seem quite alien. It was considered that your influence on government should correspond to the amount of stake you have in society, that is to say, how much you own, and particularly in the sense of property.
Thus the property owning aristocracy should have more power than the commons, the Plebs. The Patricians who were richest of all similarly should have more power than the aristocracy. So the division of government into the three institutions corresponds to a division of society into unequal "classes". The parallel between the Roman and the British systems is clear.
Now the RPGB is not, of course, proposing a replication of these class-based arrangements for the new Republican Britain but the way inequality of a non-class kind can reflect itself in the Constitution and its Institutions can be informed by the Roman example. For an explanation of how this can be we need to consult the contemporary Greek critique of the Roman system which we owe to the philosopher, Aristotle and the historian, Polybius.
The Greek view was that each of the elements of the tripartite form of Roman government had a benign version and a malign version. The benign version of the highest of the three was a wise monarch with the malign version being a tyrant. The benign version of the next down was what we would call a meritocracy and the malign version was a self-serving financial oligarchy. The benign version of the lowest level was an informed responsible people whilst the malign version would be a mob enforcing their rule on everyone else.
Why is this important now? Because it shows how what were divisions of class and wealth can translate into divisions based on merit and achievement. Inequality in a Modern Republic must be based on the Greek observers' benign model whereby influence is based on merit not background or money.
For example, the switch from having a House of Lords comprised of hereditary peers to one based on a merit is exactly what Aristotle and Polybius would favour. They understood that a society entirely based on democracy and equality would lead to decadence and instability, and the descent of the political, intellectual and cultural life of the Kingdom that we are now witnessing, due to relying too heavily on Democracy, is one they would have foreseen.
The elevation of merit and achievement to playing, not necessarily a greater but certainly, a different role in society from Democracy is a founding principle of Republican thought.
Does not this mean elitism? Yes, it does. But an elite founded on merit is a mobile elite open to all who make the necessary commitment and have the necessary innate talent.
The new Republic will see to it that everyone has the chance to develop whatever qualities they have to the full.
|
SIGN UP FOR FREE WEEKLY
EMAILED NEWSLETTER Your email address: -------------------Go to previous Newsletters ------------------- Press F11 to read FULL SCREEN press F11 to undo ------------------- JAMES HARRINGTON (1611-1677) BRITISH REPUBLICAN Political theorist of Classical Republicanism, wrote The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656). Influenced Thomas Jefferson and later Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Ideas partly responsible for U.S. political developments: written constitutions, bicameral legislatures. Imprisoned for beliefs.
 JOHN MILTON Poet 1608-1674 BRITISH REPUBLICAN
1 Eastern Orthodox situation
*Except by invasion by a foreign dictator
8. Membership of some Civil Institutions may be according to an internal election within the Institution or a committee, but this is not a democratic election.
|
